Tetiana Trach, Vivien Flokas, Daria Novikov, and Kateryna Stepanenko
May 14, 2025, 9:30 am
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1 pm ET on May 12, 2025. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 20 Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Report.
Key Takeaways:
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) intensified recruitment efforts for the state-controlled Africa Corps starting in February 2025, likely in an effort to expand Russia’s military presence in Africa and raise an active reserve that the Kremlin can use in Ukraine.
- The Russian government reportedly launched the Russian Unified Register for Military Registration (Reestrpovestok), which is responsible for distributing conscription notices electronically.
- Russia presented its first drone regiment of the newly established Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) branch during the May 9 “Victory Day” parade.
- The Russian Presidential Administration is setting information conditions to loosen the “Time of Heroes” eligibility requirement for informal units serving within the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) in order to expedite the formation of a country-wide, veteran-based elite loyal to the Kremlin.
- The Kremlin is pursuing a coordinated campaign aimed at expanding Russian military-patriotic youth organizations to support Russia’s long-term force generation efforts.
- Russian officials reportedly involved over 12 million children and teachers in celebrations ahead of the “Victory Day” parade on May 9 in support of the Kremlin’s efforts to indoctrinate and militarize the Russian youth.
- The Russian MoD is continuing to execute Putin’s stated objective of expanding mandatory genomic registration for various classes of Russian servicemen by July 1, likely as part of the Kremlin’s effort to combat desertion via a unified state database.
- Recently appointed commander of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, Colonel Abdulaziz Shikhabirov, reportedly died in Ukraine.
- The Kremlin is scaling up its missile production by doubling down on its sanctions evasion schemes and domestically producing some missile components in Russia.
- The Kremlin is attempting to set up a new production line for hexogen (RDX) explosives in an effort to expand Russia’s artillery ammunition and glide bomb stocks.
- The Russian forces reportedly procured multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) from North Korea.
- Russia is reportedly recruiting young women from Latin America, South Asia, and countries of the former Soviet Union to build Shahed strike drones in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan.
- Russia reportedly developed a new S8000 “Banderol” drone-based cruise missile.
- Russian forces are continuing to use attack helicopters to repel Ukrainian drone strikes with mixed results.
- Putin awarded the 52nd Artillery Brigade (likely part of the Russian 104th Airborne [VDV] Division) with the honorific “guards” title on May 5.
- The Russian MoD awarded on May 7 more than 200 Russian servicemen for their participation in assaults in Ukraine, likely as part of Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov’s efforts to appease Russian servicemen and ultranationalists.
- The Russian MoD awarded elements of BARS detachments operating in southern Ukraine on May 9 and 11 in a continued effort to centralize state control over informal, volunteer detachments.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Assessed Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization and undermining regime stability)
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) intensified recruitment efforts for the state-controlled Africa Corps starting in February 2025, likely in an effort to expand Russia’s military presence in Africa and raise an active reserve that the Kremlin can use in Ukraine. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Tatar-Bashkir Service Idel Realii reported on May 5 that the Russian Africa Corps is actively recruiting in the Republic of Tatarstan and actively leverages local media outlets and social media advertisements to attract recruits.[1] The head of the “Batyr” recruitment center in the Republic of Tatarstan, Vladislav Kuznetsov, told a local media agency in March 2024 that the Russian MoD is offering men aged 18 through 45 and officers up to 55 years old a one-year-long military service contract in the Africa Corps.[2] Kuznetsov stated that recruits train in Russia for the first six months and then relocate to Africa for the remaining service period. Kuznetsov stated that those who join the Africa Corps receive a one-time federal payment of 400 thousand rubles ($4,938), a regional payment of 2.1 million rubles ($25,925) from the Tatarstan Republic, and a minimum monthly salary of 240,000 rubles ($2,963). Idel.Realii calculated that the Africa Corps recruits in the Tatarstan Republic receive compensation comparable to the combined compensation provided by the Russian federal and regional recruiters. Kuznetsov claimed that the Africa Corps recruits are entitled to some state benefits, such as additional one-time payments for having children and compensation for being wounded or killed. A local Africa Corps recruiter stated in April 2025 that the Africa Corps is exclusively recruiting for operations in Africa.[3] The recruiter added that Africa Corps servicemen sign military service contracts with the Russian MoD and will have to fight in Ukraine if the Russian MoD orders them. The official Africa Corps Telegram channel also stated that active-duty servicemen fighting in Ukraine cannot be transferred to the Africa Corps.[4] The Kremlin is reportedly recruiting personnel into the Africa Corps throughout the country, including in Moscow City, Moscow Oblast, St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Krasnodar City, and Novorossiysk.[5]
Russian Involuntary Military Service (Assessed Russian objective: Expand Russia’s inactive reserve via conscription and enhance Russian administrative capacity regarding military mobilization)
The Russian government reportedly launched the Russian Unified Register for Military Registration (Reestrpovestok), which is responsible for distributing conscription notices electronically. Russian human rights organization Idite Lesom reported on May 9 that Reestrpovestok is operating across Russia and that Russian officials removed the notice that Reestrpovestok was only working in test mode in Ryazan Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, and the Republic of Mari El.[6] Idite Lesom reported that Reestrpovestok now allows Russian men to log into the portal and check the status of any active summons, but noted that the organization has not observed any reports that Russian men have begun receiving summonses from the portal as of May 9. Russian anti-mobilization resource Dvizheniye Soznatelnyh Otkazchikov (Movement of Conscientious Objectors) reported on May 9 that Reestrpovestok launched a new function on May 8, which allows men to request information from the registry of sent summonses and the Russian military information registry.[7] Reestrpovestok contains information about military registration, personal, and passport data; individual insurance account numbers; taxpayer personal identification numbers; citizenship information; education; work activity; and health status.[8] Russian opposition outlet Meduza noted that Russian officials did not officially announce the launch of Reestrpovestok and that Russian officials planned to launch the registry in Fall 2024.[9] The Kremlin has been increasingly reforming the Russian conscription apparatus since November 2022, likely to expand Russia’s inactive reserve and enhance Russia’s mobilization potential.[10]
Russian Military Reforms and Force Restructuring: (Assessed Russian objective: Restructure the Russian military to maintain the war in Ukraine while preparing for a potential large-scale conventional war with NATO)
Russia presented its first drone regiment of the newly established Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) branch during the May 9 “Victory Day” parade. Russian state media outlet RBC reported on May 9 that elements — a column — of the Russian 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment participated in the May 9 “Victory Day” parade for the first time.[11] RBC reported that Russian Senior Lieutenant Grigory Teplykh commanded the column during the parade and that the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment demonstrated various types of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including “Orlan-10”, “Orlan-30”, ZALA, “Lancet-51”, “Lancet-52”, “Harpy” and “Geran” (Shahed) drones — UAVs that Russian forces use in Ukraine. Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov announced in December 2024 that the Russian military would establish the USF branch at Russian President Vladimir Putin’s request by the third quarter of 2025.[12] ISW assessed that Russia began forming the USF as early as August 2024.[13] Ukrainian volunteer drone initiative Victory Drones reported in April 2024 that the Russian military command was finalizing the creation of the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment as part of the Central Military District (CMD).[14] Victory Drones stated that the Russian military command aimed to form 102 subordinate reconnaissance and strike units staffed by 1342 enlisted servicemen within the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment. ISW previously assessed that Russia’s establishment of separate UAV regiments would likely augment Russia’s drone support capabilities, provided the Russian MoD properly forms, staffs, supports, and integrates such UAV regiments into the larger Russian force.[15]
Integration of Veterans into Russian Society (Assessed Russian objective: Mitigate the risk of veterans emerging as a political group in a way that could erode the stability of the Russian state)
The Russian Presidential Administration is setting information conditions to loosen the “Time of Heroes” eligibility requirement for informal units serving within the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) in order to expedite the formation of a country-wide, veteran-based elite loyal to the Kremlin. Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Governor Yevgeny Balitsky reported on May 7 that Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko visited the BARS-11 Cossack volunteer special forces detachment in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[16] Balitsky claimed that the BARS-11 commander and volunteers asked Kiriyenko to extend the Time of Heroes program to BARS volunteer detachments. Balitsky implied that Putin will consider the soldiers’ request and expand the program. Putin established the “Time of Heroes” initiative in February 2024 in order to offer positions of political power to Russian veterans in an effort to form a new social stratum of Russian elites composed of loyal ultranationalists. Kiriyenko has reportedly been one of the main executors of Putin’s veteran integration campaign.[17] Kiriyenko’s publicized interaction with BARS-11 elements is likely part of Putin’s recently stated objective of lowering eligibility requirements for the “Time of Heroes” program. Putin implied that the Kremlin plans to lower the program’s eligibility requirements during a meeting of municipal officials of Russian federal subjects and the occupation administrations on April 21.[18] Putin added that the requirements can be modified if participants are patriots and make sacrifices to defend Russia. ISW previously noted claims that Putin regards veterans’ word as “law for [him],” an approach that underlies Putin’s coordinated campaign to prevent the emergence of an independent veteran society threatening the stability of the Kremlin regime.[19]
The Kremlin continues to appoint war veterans to regional government positions under the “Time of Heroes” initiative as part of its long-term campaign to militarize Russian society and maintain regime stability. Republic of North Ossetia Head Sergei Menyailo announced on May 6 the appointment of a Russian veteran and “Time of Heroes” participant, Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Abayev, as the North Ossetia Minister of Labor and Social Development.[20] Menyailo stated that Putin tasked regional governments to form a political team from veterans who “have already proven that they are ready to stand for [Russia] to the end.” Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) previously identified Lieutenant Colonel Abayev as the commander of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]).[21] The GUR reported that Abayev participated in the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast in May 2024. The official Telegram channel of the “Time of Heroes” program announced on May 7 that another veteran and “Time of Heroes” program participant, Alexei Yefimov, became the Primorsk Krai gubernatorial representative for the integration of war veterans into Russian society.[22] The Time of Heroes channel reported on May 12 that Russia also appointed Igor Yurgin as Russia’s Ministry of Education’s Director of the Department of State Policy in the sphere of child-rearing, supplementary education, and children’s recreation.[23] Time of Heroes channel reported on May 12 that the Kremlin had already employed 40 Russian veterans out of the first program cohort.
Russian occupation officials are continuing efforts to recruit veterans via the “Time of Heroes” program to raise a new class of loyal occupation officials. Sevastopol Occupation Governor Mikhail Razvozhayev reported on May 8 that he held a public council meeting for implementing the regional training program “Sevastopol — City of Heroes,” which aims to train veterans to assume jobs in the Russian government and state enterprises.[24] Razvozhayev claimed that 933 Russian veterans registered for the “Sevastopol — City of Heroes” program and that Sevastopol occupation officials selected 307 participants to participate in interviews for positions within the occupation government from May 12 through June 6. Razvozhayev added that the Sevastopol occupation government is trying to form a reserve of public administration officials so that veterans can fill vacant positions within the civil and public sectors.
The Kremlin and the Russian government are continuing to co-opt Russian servicemen, veterans, and their families by offering them state benefits. Putin signed a decree on May 8 offering free rehabilitation resort vouchers for family members of Russian military and security personnel who sustained injuries during combat operations in Ukraine or in Russia’s border regions.[25] The decree extends vouchers to family members of Russian military volunteers and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Russian Investigative Committee, the Federal Penitentiary Service, the Investigative Committee, and the National Guard (Rosgvardia). The Russian Ministry of Finance and the Russian Federal Tax Service reportedly developed changes to the Russian tax code that would give significant breaks to Russian servicemen for the calendar year of their service. The Russian Ministry of Finance and the Russian Federal Tax Service are reportedly considering granting tax breaks on personal vehicles and 600 square meters of land.[26]
Russian federal subjects are incentivizing the employment of Russian veterans with disabilities in order to facilitate the integration of veterans into civil society and address Russian labor shortages. Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko announced on May 6 that the region will offer one-million-ruble ($12,120) compensation to employers who hire disabled Russian veterans for at least two years.[27] Drozdenko stated that enterprises can use the subsidy to replenish business capital and compensate employees who are military veterans.
Militarization of Society and Youth (Assessed Russian objective: Condition Russian society and youth for military service and raise societal support for Russian war efforts)
The Kremlin is pursuing a coordinated campaign aimed at expanding Russian military-patriotic youth organizations to support Russia’s long-term force generation efforts. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu stated on May 5 that Russian officials are constantly working to develop and implement military-patriotic education of Russia’s youth to prepare them for future military service in defense of Russia.[28] Shoigu added that the Kremlin is leveraging various agencies, organizations, and regional administrations to prepare Russian youth to defend Russia, including the Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF), the Yunarmiya (Young Army Cadets National Movement), and the Russian Military Historical Society. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev called on the Russian government and society to begin efforts to memorialize the war in Ukraine and Russia‘s “lost Heroes“ during a meeting with Russian military writers and poets on May 8.[29] Medvedev stated that memorialization of Russian military history has long been the ”common thread” between generations of Russians and that Russian society must not miss its opportunity to influence how Russia’s youth retroactively perceives the war in Ukraine.
Yunarmiya Chief of the General Staff Captain Vladislav Golovin told Russian news agency TASS in an interview published on May 8 that Yunarmia — Russia’s largest youth military organization, numbering over 1.8 million members — directly prepares Russia’s children for military service and helps Russian parents raise their children ”correctly.”[30] Golovin stated that over 120,000 Yunarmia alumni now serve in Russia’s military or security agencies. Golovin also stated that Yunarmia develops and collaborates with other Russian military-patriotic programs such as the “Zarnitsa 2.0,” “Return the Hero’s Name,” “Movement of the First,” and “Victory Windows” initiatives, and the “Squad 22: ZOV” videogame set in occupied Mariupol. Golovin added that Yunarmiya encourages Russian parents of young children to join the organization as detachment leaders and bring their children to learn skills such as first aid and protocols for handling weapons. Golovin assumed command of Yunarmiya in December 2024 after completing the “Time of Heroes” program.[31]
Russian officials reportedly involved over 12 million children and teachers in celebrations ahead of the “Victory Day” parade on May 9 in support of the Kremlin’s efforts to indoctrinate and militarize the Russian youth. The Russian Federal Budgetary Agency for Children’s Development and Education (Rosdetsentr) reported on May 7 that over 12.5 million schoolchildren, students, and teachers participated in the all-Russian “Immortal Regiment: Heroes Next to Us” demonstration, which took place on educational campuses throughout Russia.[32] Rosdetsentr reported that children and teachers held photos of relatives who served in the Second World War and met with Russian veterans and servicemen who fought in Ukraine. Russian Education Minister Sergei Kravtsov stated that 10 million students and teachers participated in “Victory Day” related demonstrations in 2024.[33] Russian opposition media outlets posted footage of kindergarteners participating in “Victory Day” events in various Russian cities.[34]
Russian Desertion Reduction Measures (Assessed Russian objective: Reduce desertion rates among Russian servicemen by intensifying punishments and expanding law enforcement’s authority)
The Russian MoD is continuing to execute Putin’s stated objective of expanding mandatory genomic registration for various classes of Russian servicemen by July 1, likely as part of the Kremlin’s effort to combat desertion via a unified state database. The Russian MoD proposed to amend the law “On State Genomic Registration” on May 12. The amendment, if passed, would require all Russian servicemen who signed military service contracts with the MoD (including foreigners and those fighting abroad), informal forces fighting in “volunteer formations,” Rosgvardia elements, and law enforcement employees fighting in combat zones to submit their genomic data.[35] Putin ordered in February 2025 that the Russian MoD and other ministries institute mandatory genomic registration for Russian servicemen by July 1.[36] The Russian MoD previously only collected genomic data from prisoners, convicts, arrested individuals, and relatives of missing Russian servicemen.[37] The collection of genomic data follows the Kremlin’s efforts to establish an interdepartmental database, which gathers personal information on Russian people across different departments.[38] These efforts are aimed at tightening Russian state control over Russian society and may make it more difficult for Russians to desert, avoid the draft, or escape punishment.[39]
Russian Command Changes and Chain of Command (Russian command appointments, dismissals, and casualties among senior Russian military commanders)
Recently appointed commander of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, Colonel Abdulaziz Shikhabirov, reportedly died in Ukraine. Putin appointed Shikhabidov to command the 76th VDV Division in March 2024.[40] Independent Russian news outlet Agenstvo observed several Russian milbloggers and local social media accounts in the Republic of Dagestan reporting that Shikhabirov was killed in action and was already buried at the Troekurovskoye Cemetery in Moscow City as of May 5.[41] Agentstvo stated that schools in the Republic of Dagestan posted and later deleted posts on May 6 showing Russian schoolchildren observing moments of silence in Shikhabidov’s memory. Russian state media outlet Lenta.Ru also posted and later deleted a report about Shikhabidkov’s death on May 6.[42] The Russian military command is likely working to minimize the Russian information space’s coverage of Shikhabidov’s death, given the proximity of Shikhabidov’s promotion to his death.
Russian Defense Industrial Base (Assessed Russian objective: Increase Russia’s defense industrial base production to support Russian war efforts)
The Kremlin is scaling up its missile production by doubling down on its sanctions evasion schemes and domestically producing some missile components in Russia. Ukrainian media outlet Kanal 24 reported on May 7, citing Russian documents obtained by private intelligence company Dallas, that Russia increased the production of Kh-101 missiles, likely by acquiring Western-made components via intermediary firms such as the “TRV-Engineering” private company.[43] Kanal 24 reported that the “TRV-Engineering” company is affiliated with the Russian state-owned defense holding Tactical Missile Armament Corporation, which oversees Russian missile production. Kanal 24 reported that TPV-Engineering obtains components for the Kh-101, Kh-59, Kh-69, and 3M14 Kalibr cruise missiles and glide bombs with unified planning and correction modules (UMPK) through front companies in China and abroad. Kanal 24 reported that the Russian Ural Design Bureau “Detal” enterprise is now domestically producing altimeters for Kh-101 missiles and that Russian missile manufacturers are using Belarusian OJSC Integral enterprise microchips. Kanal 24 reported that Russia plans to produce 633 Kh-101 missiles in 2025 and 223 Kh-101 missiles in 2026, noting that the number for 2026 is subject to change. The Financial Times reported on July 10, 2024, that Russia has increased Kh-101 missile production eightfold since 2021, producing 50 missiles per month in 2024 compared to 56 missiles annually in 2021.[44] The scale of Russian planned cruise missile production suggests that the Kremlin is committed to investing in Russia’s military capabilities, likely as part of the wider campaign to intensify the missile campaign against Ukraine and in preparation for possible confrontation with NATO.
The Kremlin is attempting to set up a new production line for hexogen (RDX) explosives in an effort to expand Russia’s artillery ammunition and glide bomb stocks. A Reuters special investigation reported on May 8 that studies of documents and satellite imagery indicate that the Russian state defense company Ya. M. Sverdlov Plant is building a new production line at its Biysk Oleum Plant (BOZ) in Siberia, likely to produce RDX.[45] RDX is a component in many artillery shells, mortar rounds, missiles, and glide bombs used by Russia against Ukraine. A source close to the project and at the BOZ factory confirmed to Reuters that an expansion is underway. Documents published in 2023 by an unspecified Russian state procurement agency and later deleted indicate that the new facility is scheduled for completion in 2025 with an expected annual production capacity of 6,000 metric tons of high explosives. Reuters reported that BOZ does not currently produce RDX. Experts consulted by Reuters could not rule out the possibility that the line identified by Reuters could be for the production of HMX, which is another high explosive. Reuters estimated that the plant’s output capacity would be enough to fill 1.28 million OF-29 (152 mm) artillery shells. The GUR told Reuters that Russia produced two million 122mm and 152mm artillery rounds in 2024 and imported 2.7 million from North Korea.
The Kremlin may have decided to build a new production line in Biysk to protect Russian explosives production from Ukrainian drone strikes. Reuters reported that the Sverdlov Plant is Russia’s only significant RDX and HMX manufacturer and previously produced these explosives in a factory in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod, which Ukrainian drones struck on October 19, 2024. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Open-Source Centre (OSC) stated in a joint 2024 report that new production lines will not resolve all bottlenecks in Russia’s munitions supply chain due to wartime shortages and sanctions.[46]
The Russian forces reportedly procured multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) from North Korea. Russian milbloggers posted footage on May 7 showing Russian forces using North Korean 240 mm M1991 (or “Juche-100”) MLRS on the frontline, possibly in Kursk Oblast.[47] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces allegedly destroyed the first North Korean M1991 MLRS near Pervomaisky village in Kursk Oblast.[48] GUR Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov previously reported that North Korea supplied Russia with 120 long-range self-propelled artillery systems and 120 MLRS pieces.[49]
Russia is reportedly recruiting young women from Latin America, South Asia, and countries of the former Soviet Union to build Shahed strike drones in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime reported on May 8 that Russian recruiters targeted women ages 18 through 22 and lured them under false pretenses of participation in a work-study program.[50] Russia reportedly recruited these women online and via local intermediaries. Recruited women complained to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime about enduring long work hours, constant surveillance, punitive management, harsh working conditions, and health issues due to exposure to chemicals.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Assessed Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Russia reportedly developed a new S8000 “Banderol” drone-based cruise missile. Ukraine’s GUR reported on May 11 that the Russian MoD-sponsored Kronstadt enterprise developed a new S8000 “Banderol” cruise missile, which can be carried by the Russian “Orion” UAV.[51] The GUR reported that Kronstadt also produces several types of UAVs, including “Orion,” “Molniya,” and “Grom.”[52] The GUR reported that Kronstadt is adapting the missile for use from Mi-28N attack helicopters. The GUR reported that “Banderol” can turn at a smaller radius than traditional Russian-made cruise missiles such as Kh-101 and Kh-69, while maintaining the usual flight path. The GUR reported that the S8000 cruise missile can carry a 150-kilogram warhead and travel up to 500 kilometers at a speed of 500 kilometers per hour. A Russian milblogger claimed that “Banderol” can reach speeds of 650 kilometers per hour and carry a 115-kilogram high-explosive warhead.[53] The milblogger also noted that the S8000 cruise missile contains a Chinese-made SW80Pro-A95 turbojet engine and an eight-channel Kometa-M8 satellite signal receiver. The GUR identified several foreign components for the “Banderol” production, including Chinese, American, Japanese, Swiss, and South Korean parts.[54] A Ukrainian radio technology expert previously reported that Russian forces used the “Banderol” missile to strike Odesa Oblast several times in April 2025.[55]
Russian forces are continuing to use attack helicopters to repel Ukrainian drone strikes with mixed results. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger published footage on May 8 reportedly showing Russian Ka-52 attack helicopters targeting Ukrainian drones.[56] The milblogger noted that attack helicopters are generally effective in targeting Ukrainian drones and observed that Russian Mi-28NM attack helicopters have also been successful in shooting down Ukrainian strike drones. The milblogger observed that not all Russian attack helicopters can effectively shoot down Ukrainian drones, noting that Russian Mi-24 helicopters are too old and lack the necessary radars and modern optics to target Ukrainian drones in the rear and that Mi-8 helicopters require crews to serve as gunners. The milblogger noted that the Russian military needs to integrate different types of aircraft, including small aircraft. The milblogger argued that Russia has to develop a system for target designation, control, and assessment of the situation in the airspace.[57] The milblogger argued that such a system would enable Russian forces to see the location of Ukrainian and Russian drones and personnel in real-time.
Russian State Recognition of Officers and Military Units: (Assessed Russian objective: Honor specific Russian units for service, achievements, and hardships in Ukraine and incentivize service in distinguished units)
Putin awarded the 52nd Artillery Brigade (likely part of the Russian 104th Airborne [VDV] Division) with the honorific “guards” title on May 5.[58] The Russian military command likely formed the 52nd Artillery Brigade in January 2023 and deployed the brigade to repel Ukrainian positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast in Fall 2023.[59] ISW last observed elements of the 52nd Artillery Brigade operating in the Kherson direction in late June 2024.[60]
The Russian MoD awarded on May 7 more than 200 Russian servicemen for their participation in assaults in Ukraine, likely as part of Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov’s efforts to appease Russian servicemen and ultranationalists. The Russian MoD reported that a representative of the Russian Ground Forces awarded Russian servicemen who participated in assaults and offensive operations with “For Assault” qualification badges during a ceremony in Moscow Oblast.[61] The Russian MoD added that Belousov ordered the creation of the badge in Spring 2025 to recognize Russian assault elements. Russian milbloggers welcomed Belousov’s order, with some claiming that Belousov introduced the badge following a conversation with state-affiliated Russian milbloggers.[62]
The Russian MoD awarded elements of BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) detachments operating in southern Ukraine on May 9 and 11 in a continued effort to centralize state control over informal, volunteer detachments. The Russian MoD reported that a representative of the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the Russian General Staff awarded volunteers of the BARS-33 detachment fighting in Kherson Oblast as part of the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces (GoF) and other unspecified BARS elements in “Southern” and “Dnepr” GoFs.[63]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
